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LOCKE V. DAVEY:
THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE FEDERAL
BLAINE AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE I, § 11 OF
THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION
Mark Edward DeForrest*
What's in a name? That which we call a rose By any other word would smell as sweet.
William Shakespeare'
We cannot rule the future. We can only imagine it in terms of the present. And the
only way to do that is as thoroughly as possible to know the present.
Jerome Frank
2
I. INTRODUCTION: DOES THE STATE OF WASHINGTON HAVE BLAINE
PROVISIONS IN ITS STATE CONSTITUTION?
In the recent landmark case of Locke v. Davey3 the United States Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of Washington's practice of denying college
scholarship aid to students who were planning on pursuing courses of theological
study leading to careers in ordained ministry. In so doing the Court overruled a
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in the same case.4 The court of appeals
had found that Washington's denial of equal access to scholarship funds by
students planning to study theology in anticipation of a ministerial career violated
the First Amendment's guarantees regarding the free exercise of religion.5 The
Supreme Court held otherwise, finding that there was sufficient "play in the
joints"'6 regarding First Amendment jurisprudence to provide constitutional
legitimacy to a state's decision to differentially treat students studying theology
* Assistant Professor of Legal Research and Writing, Gonzaga University School of Law,
Spokane, Washington; B.A., Western Washington University (1992); J.D., Gonzaga University School
of Law (1997). I would like to thank my research assistant, Jennifer Hudson, for her invaluable
assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. William Shakespeare, The Tragedy of Romeo and Juliet, act 2, scene 2,11.43-44.
2. Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind 155 (Brentano's 1930).
3. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
4. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748 (2002).
5. Id. at 759-60.
6. Davey, 540 U.S. at 718 (quoting Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)).
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with an eye towards pursuing ordained ministry from other students under the
federal Establishment Clause.7
A number of the amicus briefs submitted to the Court in Davey raised an
issue involving the characterization of the applicable provisions of the Washington
state constitution that were being reviewed for possible conflicts with the federal
8Constitution. These amici argued that the Washington Constitution's relevant
provisions embodied animus against religion, and were reflective of a failed
nineteenth-century anti-Catholic attempt to include a prohibition on public
funding of "religious sects or denominations"9 within the federal Constitution.
This failed amendment, known as the "Blaine Amendment" after its primary
congressional sponsor, James Blaine of Maine, lives on in the text of various state
constitutions, including Washington. °
The Washington Constitution contains three provisions prohibiting
government aid for religious establishment.1" These three provisions all date from
Washington's formal entry into the Union as a state.12 The first provision, Article
I, § 11, guarantees religious freedom for the inhabitants of Washington, while at
the same time prohibiting "public money or property" from being used to support
religious establishment, "worship, exercise or instruction." The second provision,
Article IX, § 4, directly prohibits any "sectarian control or influence" from being
exercised over "schools maintained or supported wholly or in part by the public
funds." The third provision, often overlooked, is found in Article XXVI, the state
compact with the federal government. In that article the state constitution affirms
that "[pirovision shall be made for the establishment and maintenance of systems
of public schools free from sectarian control, which shall be open to all the
children of [Washington] state."' 3  The academic literature examining
Washington's pertinent constitutional texts identifies those texts as connected
7. Id. at 721.
8. See e.g. Br. of Amici Curiae Becket Fund for Relig. Liberty, et al. at 4, Davey, 540 U.S. 712
[hereinafter Becket Br.]; Br. for Amicus Curiae Teresa M. Becker in Support of Respt., Davey, 540
U.S. 712.
9. Becket Br., supra n. 8, at 14.
10. H.R. Jt. Res. 1, 44th Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 14, 1875) [hereinafter Joint Resolution]; Toby J.
Heytens, Student Author, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 Va. L. Rev. 117, 134 (2000) (noting
that roughly thirty states joined Washington in adopting state Blaine-type constitutional amendments
by the early 1900s); Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake: School Choice, the First Amendment, and State
Constitutional Law, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 657, 673 (1998) (placing the number at twenty-nine by
1890) (citing Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 Am. J. Leg. History 38, 43
(1992)). For examples of state Blaine amendments, see Ala. Const. art. XIV, § 263; Alaska Const. art.
VII, § 1; Ariz. Const. art. IX, § 10; Ark. Const. art. XIV, § 2; Colo. Const. art. V, § 34; Del. Const. art.
X, § 3; Fla. Const. art. I, § 3, art. IX, § 6; Ga. Const. art. I, § 2, 7; Haw. Const. art. X, § 1; Idaho Const.
art. IX, § 5; Ind. Const. art. I, § 6; Ky. Const. §§ 186, 189; Mass. Const. art. XVIII; Mich. Const. art. I, §
4, art. VIII, § 2; Minn. Const. art. I, § 16, art XIII, § 2; Miss. Const. art VIII, § 208; Mo. Const. art. I, § 7,
art. IX, §§ 5, 8; Neb. Const. art. VII, § 11; Nev. Const. art. XI, § 9; N.C. Const. art. IX, § 6; N.D. Const.
art. VIII, § 1; Okla. Const. art. II, § 5, art. XI, § 5; S.D. Const. art. VIII, § 16; Tex. Const. art. VII, § 5;
Va. Const. art. VIII, §§ 10, 11; Wash. Const. art. I, § 11, art. IX, § 4; Wis. Const. art. X, § 6; Wyo. Const.
art. VII, § 12.
11. Wash. Const. art. I, § 11, art. IX, § 4, art. XXVI; see also Malyon v. Pierce County, 935 P.2d
1272, 1279 (Wash. 1997).
12. Enabling Act of February 22, 1889, 25 Stat. 676 (1889) [hereinafter Enabling Act].
13. Wash. Const. art. XXVI.
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both in ideology and purpose to the federal Blaine Amendment. 14 Yet, in its
decision in Davey, the Court rejected that identification, at least for Article I, § 11
of the state constitution and, without providing any detailed examination of the
historical connections between the Washington Constitution and the failed Blaine
Amendment, stated instead that a connection between Article I, § 11 of the
Washington Constitution and the Blaine Amendment had not been adequately
established.15
While on the surface such a finding may not seem to be of great importance
in the decision, it actually was critical to the characterization of the constitutional
issues present before the Court in Davey. One of the pivotal constitutional
questions that has risen to the forefront in cases involving the public funding of
private educational activities is the First Amendment's prohibition on viewpoint
discrimination. Since Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of
Virginia,16 the application of viewpoint discrimination doctrine has become an
issue in dealing with the Establishment Clause concerns over providing access to
generally available public funds for arguably religious purposes or expression.17 In
particular, viewpoint discrimination doctrine has played a central part in the
debate over publicly funded school voucher and scholarship programs for private
religious education, and it played a significant role in the appellate court decision
that was appealed to the Supreme Court in Davey. 8 By asserting that a link
between Article I, § 11 of the Washington state constitution and the overtly
discriminatory Blaine Amendment from the nineteenth-century had not been
established, the Supreme Court effectively dodged the viewpoint discrimination
issue, and was able to resolve Davey based on the play in the joints that the Court
found in the Establishment Clause.19
This being the case, the question arises: was the Court correct in its refusal to
accept the identification of Article I, § 11 of Washington's constitution as a Blaine
amendment? There is no question that Article I, § 11, like the other applicable
provisions of the Washington Constitution, is not officially identified in the text as
a "Blaine Amendment" in the text of the state constitution.20 In addition, there is
hardly any explicit reference to the Blaine Amendment in Washington's
constitutional jurisprudence dealing with the application of Article I, § 11.21 On
the surface, at least, it would appear that the Court's refusal to link Article I, § 11
14. Frank J. Conklin & James M. Vachd, The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of
the Washington Constitution-A Proposal to the Supreme Court, 8 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 411 (1985);
Robert F. Utter & Edward J. Larson, Church and State on the Frontier: The History of the
Establishment Clauses in the Washington State Constitution, 15 Hastings Const. L.Q. 451 (1988).
15. Davey, 540 U.S. at 723 n. 7.
16. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the U. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
17. See U.S. v. American Library Assn., 539 U.S. 194, 206 (2003); see also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at
837.
18. 299 F.3d at 766-68 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
19. 540 U.S. at 719.
20. Article I, § 11 is titled "Religious Freedom"; Article IX, § 4 is titled "Sectarian Control or
Influence Prohibited"; and Article XXVI is titled "Compact With The United States."
21. The only overt reference to the Blaine Amendment in Washington's applicable case law is in
Malyon, 935 P.2d at 1279 n. 13.
2004]
3
DeForrest: Locke v. Davey: The Connection between the Federal Blaine Amendme
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2004
TULSA LAW REVIEW
to the failed Blaine Amendment is justifiable. Given the lack of explicit textual
linkage in the Washington Constitution's actual wording, recognition that Article
I, § 11 was in fact an offspring of the Blaine Amendment could seem to be
something of an overreach.
There are strong reasons, however, to believe that the Supreme Court made
a significant error in its characterization of Article I, § 11 of the Washington
Constitution. It is the contention of this article that the history underlying and the
jurisprudence applying Washington's constitutional prohibitions on the
establishment of religion-found in their entirety in Articles I, § 11; IX, § 4; and
XXVI-demonstrate a definitive link to James Blaine and his failed amendment,
both in origin and in application. While there is no doubt that the form of
Washington's applicable constitutional provisions is different from that of the
failed Blaine Amendment, the substance is the same.2 The purpose of this article
is to demonstrate that both the historical and jurisprudential records support the
assertion that Washington's constitutional prohibitions on the establishment of
religion are positively connected to the failed Blaine Amendment: what the Blaine
amendment sought to do on the national level, the Washington Constitution's
establishment prohibitions accomplish at the state level, and were so intended to
do by the framers of the state constitution. The history and function of
Washington's applicable constitutional texts reflect both the hand of the sponsor
of the Blaine Amendment and the purpose that motivated his failed attempt to
amend the United States Constitution.23
This article will explore the link between the Blaine Amendment and the
Washington Constitution. Section II will explore the defining characteristics of
the Blaine Amendment and how those characteristics were mirrored in
Washington's constitution. This section contends that while the language and
superficial structure of the various proposed versions of the Blaine Amendment
and Washington Constitution differ, the applicable effect of the texts are for all
intents and purposes the same. What the different versions of the Blaine
Amendment consistently sought to accomplish, Washington's constitution does
accomplish. Section III provides an overview of the history of the inclusion of
those texts in Washington State's fundamental charter. This section examines the
textual connection between the Washington Constitution's Blaine-style provisions
and the failed Blaine Amendment. It will also explore the political and ideological
connections between the Washington constitutional convention and the political
movement that supported both James Blaine and his proposed constitutional
amendment. Last, Section IV will argue that key legal cases from Washington
demonstrate the link between the various Blaine-style provisions of the
Washington Constitution and the failed Blaine Amendment.
22. Compare Wash. Const. art. I, § 11, art. IX, § 4, and art. XXVI with Joint Resolution, supra n. 10;
Enabling Act, supra n. 12.
23. Conklin & Vach, supra n. 14, at 431-33; Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment
Reconsidered, 36 Am. J. Leg. History 38, 53-54 (1992)); Viteritti, supra n. 10, at 670-72.
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II. WHAT IS THE DEFINING CHARACTERISTIC OF A BLAINE AMENDMENT?
A. The Original Federal Blaine Amendment
In order to accurately discuss the connection between Washington's
constitutional provisions on aid to sectarian education and other religious
activities on one hand, and the Blaine Amendment on the other, it is first
necessary to identify clearly just what the Blaine Amendment was. The term
"Blaine Amendment" is used to describe a proposed federal constitutional
amendment from the 1870s, sponsored by Representative (later Senator) James
24Blaine of Maine. Blaine proposed the amendment on December 14, 1875 in an
effort to effectuate a proposal by then-President Grant to ensure that public
primary and secondary education would remain free from control by "any
religious sect." 25 In addition, Blaine wanted to make sure that public funds would
never be given directly to "religious sects or denominations., 26 Blaine's original
amendment read as follows:
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any State for the
support of public schools, or derived from any public fund therefor, nor any public
lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect, nor shall
any money so raised or lands so devoted be divided between religious sects or
denominations.27
Blaine's proposed amendment would have sheltered public education from
sectarian control through the use of two separate mechanisms. First, Blaine's
amendment would have directly applied the religion clauses of the First
Amendment to the states.28 In the era prior to the incorporation of wide swaths of
the Bill of Rights to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, this was a
radical and far-reaching proposal. 9 Second, Blaine's amendment decreed that
public monies and property, whether specified for education or other purposes,
would remain outside the control of any and all overtly religious institutions.30
Although Blaine's amendment was worded generally and seems at first blush
to apply to all religious institutions that would seek to receive overt aid from the
government, there was a specific religious institution targeted by the amendment,
namely, the Roman Catholic Church. 31 The Catholic Church had entered into
32political controversy over the common school issue. The common schools were
the public schools of their day, and had a large role in assimilating and educating




28. Green, supra n. 23, at 38.
29. Viteritti, supra n. 10, at 671.
30. Id.
31. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828-29 (2000) (citing Green, supra n. 23).
32. See Viteritti, supra n. 10, at 667-68; see also Green, supra n. 23, at 41-44, 48.
2004]
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the offspring of the immigrants then moving into the United States from Europe.33
The schools did not simply educate students in the basics of the English language
or the Three Rs.34 Rather, the schools were actively involved in promoting the
values and beliefs that were considered part and parcel of the American
experience." These values and beliefs were the key tenets of the Protestant
36religion. While no particular form of the Protestant faith was taught in public
schools, generalized Protestantism was.37  Common use was made of the
Authorized King James Version of the Bible, for example, and Protestant
devotional activity was widespread, as were denunciations of the Catholic faith.38
Viewing morality and Christianity as both necessary and connected in a republic,
the common schools were, as one scholar has noted, "the primary promulgators of
[the] Protestant way of life. 39
Roman Catholics, naturally enough, often objected to sending their children
to such schools.4 ° In addition, many Catholics sought public financial support for
Catholic parochial education on the theory that it was only fair for Catholic
schools to receive such support when the official common schools were engaged in
teaching an educational curriculum that was inherently shaped and formed by
Protestantism. 41 As Catholic numbers grew, this effort of securing public funds for
parochial education became more successful.42 Efforts were also undertaken to
try to secularize the common schools, although this effort met with mixed
success.4 3 A backlash ensued, against both the move to secularize the common
schools and the move to provide public funds for Catholic parochial schools.
44
Soon, a full-fledged political controversy was in play. And in this controversy, the
word "sectarian" had a clear and unambiguous meaning-Catholic.
45
Blaine's efforts to craft a constitutional amendment, building on prior efforts
from the early 1870s to amend the Constitution to prohibit government aid to
sectarian education, were jolted to life by leaders of the Republican Party who
were eager to use the common school issue as a political stalking horse in the
elections of 1876.46 After Blaine submitted his amendment to Congress, it
languished until the political convention season in June of 1876. Blaine was
running for the GOP nomination for the presidency, but was unable to sway a
33. Viteritti, supra n. 10, at 668.
34. Id. at 666-68.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 666.
37. Id.
38. Viteritti, supra n. 10, at 666-68.
39. Green, supra n. 23, at 45.
40. Id. at 42-44.
41. Id. at 42-47.
42. Id. at 43.
43. ld. at 46-47; see also John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the
Establishment Clause, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 279, 282 (2001).
44. Green, supra n. 23, at 54 (citing Two "Favorite Sons," 22 Nation 173, 173 (Mar. 16, 1876)).
45. That "sectarian" was used as a code word for "Catholic," was recognized by a plurality in the
Court's formal opinion written by Justice Thomas in Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828-29.
46. Green, supra n. 23, at 49.
[Vol. 40:295
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majority of the convention delegates to support him.47 However, despite Blaine's
failure to obtain the GOP nomination, a statement was included within the
Republican platform opposing government aid to "any school or institution under
sectarian control.,
48
Eventually, the Republicans were able to move Blaine's amendment through
the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives.4 ' The House version of
Blaine's amendment was significantly altered by the addition of a clause that
allowed Congress to retain its full scope of legislative authority in regard to the
common schools. 50 The Senate, then controlled by the Republicans, found this
unacceptable and significantly reworked the amendment, expanding its
prohibition on government funding of sectarian schools by including a prohibition
on the teaching of "particular creeds" or religious "tenets" in a common school."
In addition, Blaine's original prohibition on government funding of religious
institutions was broadened to include any religious "institution under the control
of any religious or anti-religious sect, organization, or denomination."5 2 At the
same time, however, the Senate version decreed that the prohibition on the
teaching of religious tenets in the common schools did not mandate the removal of
Bible reading as part of the curriculum.53 These added provisions effectively
ensured that, had the amendment been enacted, the common schools would have
maintained their general Protestant character. However, after heated debate in
the Senate, where charges involving overt anti-Catholicism were raised against the
amendment, 4 the Senate version of the Blaine Amendment failed to receive the
necessary two-thirds vote to be sent on to the states for ratification.55 But the
failure of the Blaine Amendment was only the beginning.
B. Blaine Amendments in the States
The defeat of the Blaine Amendment did not end the effort by the federal
government to influence the common school issue. The different versions of
Blaine's amendment had received strong support in both the House of
56Representatives and the Senate. And while that support was insufficient to lead
to a successful constitutional amendment, it was more than enough to continue
47. Id. at 56.
48. Id. (quoting National Party Platforms vol. 1, 53-54 (Donald Bruce Johnson comp., rev. ed., U.
Ill. Press 1978)).
49. Id. at 57-58.
50. Id. at 58.
51. Green, supra n. 10, at 60 (citing 4 Cong. Rec. 5453 (1876)).
52. Id.
53. Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments: Origins,
Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 551, 568 (2003) (citing Green, supra
n. 23, at 60).
54. For a discussion of the Senate debate, see id. at 569-73 (citing 4 Cong. Rec. 5580-95 (1876))
(summarizing statements of Senators Bogy, Whyte, Edmunds, Morton, Stevenson, and Eaton).
55. 4 Cong. Rec. at 5595 (1876).
56. Id. (reporting the Senate vote was 28 in favor and 16 opposed, with 27 senators absent; thus, the
vote did not garner the necessary two-thirds majority for passage); id. at 5191 (reporting the Blaine
Amendment passed out of the House of Representatives with 180 yeas and only 7 nays).
2004]
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exercising influence on a national scale. While many states, both before and after
the Blaine Amendment's formal rejection by the Senate, had voluntarily enacted
prohibitions on state aid to sectarian institutions, there was a growing movement
within the Congress to mandate that territories seeking to become states include
such provisions in their own constitutions as a condition for statehood.57 As a
consequence, either voluntarily or involuntarily, roughly thirty states now have
Blaine-style provisions in their constitutions.58
In the 1880s and 1890s, Senator Henry Blair, a congressional ally of Blaine's,
introduced legislation to prohibit aid to sectarian schools while protecting the
generic Protestant character of the common school system.59 While his attempts at
legislative enactments were unsuccessful, Blair supported successful efforts at
mandating the inclusion of Blaine-style language in the constitutions of new states
entering the Union. 60  The best known-but not the only-example of such
congressional efforts to compel states to include Blaine-style provisions in their
constitutions is the 1889 Enabling Act that permitted the North Dakota, South
Dakota, Montana, and Washington territories to organize for statehood.6' As a
condition for statehood, the Enabling Act required that those territories include
provisions within their proposed state constitutions supporting public schools free
from "sectarian control.",62 Without such a prohibition, the territory's bid for
statehood was doomed to fail. The language of the Blaine Amendment
prohibiting sectarian control of public-funded schools was thereby compulsorily
grafted into the fundamental charter of a number of states-Washington among
them.
C. The Question of Identification
1. What Qualifies as a State Blaine Amendment?
While the history of the Blaine Amendment is well known, and the
widespread presence of Blaine-style language in state constitutions is an
undisputed fact, a question does arise about the identification of state Blaine-style
provisions with the Blaine Amendment. Does the fact that various state
constitutional provisions-including Washington's-mirror language used in the
various proposed versions of Blaine's amendment justify identifying those state
provisions with Blaine's failed proposal to amend the federal Constitution? And
what about the language found in Washington's Article I, § 11? The Supreme
Court's opinion in Locke v. Davey, at least at footnote 7, throws such an
57. Viteritti, supra n. 10, at 673.
58. Heytens, supra n. 10, at 134.
59. Utter & Larson, supra 14, at 464.
60. Conklin & Vach6, supra n. 14, at 436 n. 126; see also Utter & Larson, supra n. 14, at 461-62.
61. Viteritti, supra n. 10, at 673.
62. Conklin & Vach6, supra n. 14, at 436 (noting that the Enabling Act required "establishment and
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identification issue into question.63 While the Court postulated that it is possible
the Washington Constitution provisions dealing with prohibiting sectarian control
of public education may have a connection to the Blaine Amendment, it rejected
the notion that such a characterization had been established regarding Article I, §
11. 64  In particular, the Court found that while Washington's constitutional
prohibition regarding "sectarian control" of public education was mandated by the
1889 Enabling Act, it denied that a "credible connection 6 ' had been established
between the Blaine Amendment and Washington's overt prohibition on the use of
"public money or property" in support of "any religious worship, exercise or
instruction, or the support of any religious establishment." 66 And it was the
application of that later prohibition, found at the tail end of Article I, § 11, that
was precisely the issue in Davey.
Complicating this inquiry is the simple fact that the identification of state
constitutional provisions with the failed Blaine Amendment is an area of the law
that has its areas of opacity. Two examples suffice to prove this point. In New
York, which has Blaine-style state constitutional prohibitions on state government
financing of religious institutions, the courts have clearly recognized such
constitutional provisions as Blaine Amendments.6  However, Arizona-like
Washington-was required by Congress to place Blaine-style language in its state
constitution as a condition for statehood,68 but the Arizona Supreme Court has
declined to draw such a connection.69
In Kotterman v. Killian,7 ° the Arizona court refused to find that the state's
constitutional mandate prohibiting state funding for the "aid of any church, or
private or sectarian school," as well as "any religious worship, exercise, or
instruction"'" was an example of a state Blaine amendment. In that case the
Arizona court was asked to examine the constitutionality of a 1997 state program
that provided a tax credit to Arizona residents who could donate the credit to
"school tuition organization[s]. 72  The constitutionality of the program was
challenged, with the plaintiffs alleging that the program constituted a violation of
both the First Amendment and Arizona's state constitution. 73 The court rejected
the plaintiffs' contentions, and upheld the constitutional validity of the program."
In its decision, the court did not find a clear and direct link between the applicable
63. Davey, 540 U.S. at 723 n. 7.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Wash. Const. art. I, § 11.
67. See College of New Rochelle v. Nyquist, 326 N.Y.S.2d 765, 769-71 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dept.
1971).
68. Enabling Act of June 20, 1910, 36 Stat. 557, 570 (1910) (Arizona); Enabling Act, supra n. 12
(Washington).
69. Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 621-22 (Ariz. 1999).
70. 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999).
71. Id. at 617 (quoting Ariz. Const. art. II, § 12, art. IX, § 10).
72. Id. at 609 (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 43-1089(A) (1997)).
73. Id. at 610.
74. Id. at 616, 625.
2004]
9
DeForrest: Locke v. Davey: The Connection between the Federal Blaine Amendme
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2004
TULSA LAW REVIEW
provisions of the Arizona Constitution and the Blaine Amendment. At the same
time, however, the court noted difficulty in applying Blaine Amendment-style
requirements because of the failed Blaine Amendment's blatant anti-Catholic
"discriminatory intent."" Obviously, the court believed there was a connection
between the Arizona Constitution and the failed Blaine Amendment-why
address the difficulty of applying the Blaine Amendment7 6 if there is no Blaine
Amendment to apply?-but decided to leave the link obscure.
2. Washington's Blaine-style Provisions and the Enabling Act of 1889
This obscurity regarding state Blaine-style amendments is complicated in the
case of Washington's constitution by the simple fact that, as the Supreme Court
pointed out in Davey, not all of Washington's Blaine-style provisions were
mandated by the 1889 Enabling Act.77 As noted previously, Washington has three
major Blaine-style sections in its constitution. Article I, § 11 prohibits state money
or property from being allocated for "any religious worship, exercise or
instruction, or the support of any religious establishment." Article IX, § 4
contains the prohibition on "sectarian control or influence" over public schools.
The compact between the state and the federal government, found in Article
XXVI, reiterates, among other things, the requirements of Article IX, § 4 that the
state public schools remain free of "sectarian control."
There is no question that the content of Article IX, § 4 and Article XXVI is
mandated by the Enabling Act of 1889. The wording of the act itself makes this
clear:
That provision shall be made for the establishment and maintenance of systems of
public schools, which shall be open to all the children of said State[] and free from
sectarian control.
78
This language is virtually identical to the operative language contained
within Article XXVI.79 But what about Article I, § 11? There is no mention of
the language from Article I, § 11 anywhere in the Enabling Act. Not only is the
specific language missing, the Enabling Act does not even raise the issue of the
establishment of religion by the state, outside of the specific context of public
school education.8° Hence, the language found in Article I, § 11, language that
was the basis of the Washington policy under review in Davey, was not mandated,
as the Supreme Court's footnote in Davey correctly points out, by the 1889
75. Kotterman, 972 P.2d at 624.
76. Id.
77. 540 U.S. 723 n. 7 (noting that the federal Enabling Act's Blaine-style language was incorporated
in Article IX, § 4 of the Washington Constitution, and there is no textual connection between
Washington's Article I, § 11 and the Enabling Act).
78. Enabling Act, supra n. 12.
79. Wash. Const. art. XXVI ("Provision shall be made for the establishment and maintenance of
systems of public schools free from sectarian control, which shall be open to all the children of said
state.").
80. Compare Wash. Const. art. I, § 11 with Enabling Act, supra n. 12.
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Enabling Act.81 It appears that it was voluntarily included by the territorial
delegates who met to draft the Washington Constitution in 1889.2 This
information raises the question as to whether the lack of any mandate in the
Enabling Act requiring the language found in Article I, § 11 means that it is
improper to characterize that article as a Blaine Amendment provision? The
answer to that question, as the next section will demonstrate, is no.
III. THE FAILED FEDERAL BLAINE AMENDMENT AND
ARTICLE I, § 11 OF THE WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION
A. Textual Connections Between Article I, § 11 and the Federal Blaine
Amendment
While it is true that the Enabling Act itself does not require a provision like
Article I, § 11, such a provision is part and parcel of the classic versions of the
Blaine Amendment that were proposed by Blaine himself, modified and ratified
by the House of Representatives, and then later amended and ratified by the
Senate. In all three versions of the Blaine Amendment, language was included
with similar purpose and effect to the language in Article I, § 11 that was at the
center of the constitutional question in Locke v. Davey."3
The relevant language of Article I, § 11 reads as follows: "No public money
or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise
or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment." The language from
Article I, § 11 parallels language found in all three versions of the Blaine
Amendment that were put before Congress in 1875-76. 4 The original amendment
drafted and submitted by Blaine contains language that goes beyond the common
school issue to include government support for religious institutions as well."5
81. Davey, 540 U.S. at 723 n. 7; see also Enabling Act, supra n. 12.
82. See supra n. 78.
83. See 540 U.S. 712.
84. Id. See also Green, supra n. 23, at 60 ("no public revenue.., shall be appropriated to or made
or used for the support of any school, educational or other institution under the control of any religious
or anti-religious sect, organization, or denomination, or wherein the particular creeds or tenets shall be
taught." (quoting Sen. Jud. Comm. Rpt., 4 Cong. Rec. at 5453)); id. at 55 ("No money received by
taxation in any State for the support of public schools, or derived from any public fund therefor, nor
any public lands devoted thereto shall ever be under the control of any religious sect, nor shall any
money so raised nor lands so devoted be divided between religious sects or denominations." (quoting
Congressman William J. O'Brien's (D-Md.) alternative to Blaine's original amendment, 4 Cong. Rec.
at 440-441)); id. at 59 (quoting Sen. Frederick Frelinghuysen's (R-N.J.) version of the Blaine
Amendment, 4 Cong. Rec. at 5245, which stated in part, "no money raised by taxation in any State...
shall be appropriated to any school, educational or other institution, that is under the control of any
religious sect or denomination").
85. Compare Blaine's original amendment ("No State shalt make any law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in
any State for the support of public schools, or derived from any public fund therefor, nor any public
lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect; nor shall any money so
raised or lands so devoted be divided between religious sects or denominations."); Green, supra n. 23,
at 53 (quoting 4 Cong. Rec. at 205) with the applicable language from the Washington Constitution's
text at Article I, § 11 ("No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any
religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment.").
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Blaine's original text specifically prohibits states from using public funds or lands
to support religious sects or denominations. This prohibition, while differing in
specific terminology, mirrors the topics covered by the Washington Constitution's
prohibitions in Article I, § 11. 86 Both provisions prohibit the use of public monies
or property to support religious institutions. While Washington's text provides a
more extensive recitation of the specific activities targeted for exclusion from
public support, its provisions do not stand in contradiction to the original Blaine
Amendment. This point has been expressly recognized by the Washington
87Supreme Court in a footnote in Malyon v. Pierce County, where the court quotes
a scholarly article concluding that Article I, § 11 seeks to "address the basic





The versions of the Blaine Amendment that were before Congress likewise
are linguistically linked to Washington's Article I, § 11. The House version
contained language regarding the prohibition on the use of public funds and
property identical to that proposed in Blaine's original amendment. 89 The Senate
version has even stronger parallels to the language of Article I, § 11. In the Senate
version, the appropriation of public funds for, or the guaranteeing of loans to,
"any religious or anti-religious sect, organization or denomination" was prohibited
absolutely, particularly in regard to activities undertaken by a religious institution
to foster or further "its interests or tenets."9 This language, while again not
identical to that contained in Washington's constitution, has a strong topical
resonance to the language in Article I, § 11 about prohibiting the use of public
funds or property in support of "any religious establishment," "religious worship,
exercise or instruction. '"91
Interestingly enough, there is one significant variation between the Senate
version of the Blaine Amendment and Washington's Article I, § 11. In the
Senate's Blaine Amendment there was specific language to permit "the reading of
the Bible in any school or institution."92 This language is completely lacking in
Article I, § 11, as has been noted in a previous scholarly investigation of the Blaine
Amendment's influence on the Washington Constitution.93 Oddly enough, the
Washington Supreme Court has had to deal with the impact of this omission in
two separate cases involving the interpretation of Article I, §11: Deare v. Frazier
9 4
and Calvary Bible Presbyterian Church of Seattle v. Board of Regents of the
University of Washington.9'
86. Compare Wash Const. art. I, § 11 with Joint Resolution, supra n. 10.
87. 935 P.2d 1272 (Wash. 1997).
88. Id. at 1279 n. 13 (quoting Utter & Larson, supra n. 14, at 473).
89. Compare Wash. Const. art. I, § 11 with Joint Resolution, supra n. 10.
90. Green, supra n. 23, at 60 (quoting 4 Cong. Rec. at 5453).
91. Wash. Const. art. 1, § 11.
92. Green, supra n. 23, at 60 (quoting 4 Cong. Rec. at 5453).
93. Utter & Larson, supra n. 14, at 476.
94. 173 P. 35 (Wash. 1918).
95. 436 P.2d 189 (Wash. 1968).
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In Dearie, a case dating from 1918, the court addressed whether a school
district could provide credit to students who participated in Bible study classes
outside of the public school, either in the home or by religious institutions.96 The
City of Everett had established such a program, where students would receive
credit for such Bible study but only if they succeeded in passing an exam covering
the "historical, biographical, narrative and literary features of the Bible."97 When
the constitutionality of the program was challenged, the school district responded
by noting that the exam did not test students regarding the religious content of the
Bible, and that there was no direct use of public funds to support religious
establishment, "worship, exercise or instruction., 98 The Dearle court found that
despite the contours of the program, it still ran afoul of Article I, § 11, which
provided a "sweeping and comprehensive" prohibition on the use of public money
to support "'any religious worship, exercise or instruction.' 99 The court found
that the purpose of Article I, § 11 was not only to prohibit state sponsorship of
religious indoctrination and exercise, but also "their natural consequence-
religious discussion and controversy. '"'0° Since the reading of scripture could not
help but engender such discussion and controversy, the school district's program
was, the court held, in violation of the state constitution's mandate.'0 ' This was
made even more clear, in the court's view, by the fact that the instruction given
from the Bible was to be carried out "at the hands of sectarian agents.
10 2
After Dearie, the Washington Supreme Court revisited the topic of Bible
study as a part of government-funded education in Calvary Bible.03 There, the
court addressed the issue of whether the teaching of the Bible as literature as part
of the curriculum of the University of Washington's English department ran afoul
of both Articles I, § 11 and IX, § 4 of the Washington Constitution.' °4 The court,
after an extensive overview of the nature of the study of the Bible that was
included in the curriculum,0 5 found that the evidence submitted to the trial court
in the case supported the university's contention that the Bible was being taught in
an objective and scholarly fashion, not in an attempt to "indoctrinate anyone," but
rather as a secular field of study that "was not taught from a religious point of
view. ' 1°6 Since the university was teaching the Bible in such a manner, without an
attempt to promote or advance a particular religious tenet, the court found that
neither state constitutional provision was violated.'0 7
96. 173 P. at 35-36.
97. Id. at 36.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 37.
100. Id.
101. Dearie, 173 P. at 38.
102. Id.
103. 436 P.2d 189.
104. Id. at 190.
105. Id. at 191.
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The Dearie and Calvary Bible cases are clearly distinguishable, given the fact
that the level and manner of instruction involved in both cases is significantly
different. Dearle deals with credit being provided in public schools at the pre-
collegiate level for essentially private Bible study carried out in the home or
within the confines of outside religious organizations. 1 8 Calvary Bible, on the
other hand, addresses the question of receiving credit for coursework on the Bible
carried out within a university setting, on campus, in classes operating under the
control and direction of an established university department.' °9 As far back as
1916, the Washington Supreme Court had held that university-level education was
distinct from the primary and secondary level of public education for purposes of
state constitutional analysis. 10 This distinction between state-funded collegiate
and public school educational systems was reinforced after Calvary Bible in the
case of DeFunis v. Odegaard,"l where the Washington Supreme Court refused to
apply a non-Blaine provision of Article IX to state colleges and universities.
Thus, while the differences in outcome between the two cases can be easily
explained, there is a deeper commonality at work in the court's approach to
constitutional principle in each case. Both cases evidence an overriding concern
to avoid allowing public educational money to be used to support sectarian
activities. The court in Calvary Bible took great care to note in its opinion that the
study of the Bible occurring at the University of Washington's English department
was neutral and offered "as part of a secular program of education to advance the
knowledge of students and the learning of mankind.""' While the Dearle court in
its opinion expressed skepticism about whether the study of the Bible could ever
be free of religious impulses, its primary concern was the same: to safeguard the
public educational system from losing its non-sectarian character." 3  Both
decisions, although coming to different conclusions regarding the acceptability of
publicly funded study of the Bible, affirm the core value of the Blaine
Amendment to prevent sectarian influence or control over government-funded
education.
B. The Political and Ideological Influence of Blaine on the Washington
Constitutional Convention
Along with Article IX, § 4 and Article XXVI of the Washington
Constitution, Article I, § 11 has strong textual and ideological similarities to the
versions of the Blaine Amendment that were proposed directly by James Blaine
himself, or by the House of Representatives, or the Senate. As one law review
article puts it, the main issues that the Washington Blaine-style provisions address
108. 173 P. at 35-36.
109. 436 P.2d at 190-91.
110. Litchman v. Shannon, 155 P. 783, 784.
111. 529 P.2d 438 (1974).
112. 436 P.2d at 191.
113. 173 P. at 37-38.
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"are the same three issues that the Blaine Amendment addressed.""114 But, as
noted by the Supreme Court in Davey, while the Enabling Act that permitted
Washington to achieve statehood mandated the language found in Article IX, § 4
and Article XXVI, it did not overtly mandate the inclusion of the provisions of
Article I, § 11.115 That being the case, how was Washington influenced to include
Blaine material in Article I, § 11? This is a critical question for understanding the
pervasive influence of Blaine's ideas over the drafting of Washington's state
constitution.
Unfortunately, there is no record of the actual debates or discussions that
occurred during the Washington constitutional convention." 6 While minutes of
the debates were taken, no money was appropriated to transcribe the minutes." 7
Hence, there is no detailed record of what was actually said on the floor of the
state constitutional convention. Even the journal of the state constitutional
convention, containing a record of the procedures during the convention, was not
published until 1962.118 Fortunately, there is enough information in the historical
record, along with the journal, to flesh out the connection between Blaine and the
Washington constitutional convention.
By the time Washington was organizing for statehood, Blaine's political
career in Congress was over." 9 However, Blaine remained a national political
figure.120 After the Civil War, Blaine had led congressional efforts to moderate
the policies of the Republican Party. He led efforts within the GOP to counter
the "Stalwart" or "Radical" Republicans who championed a more vigorous policy
on civil rights and a more punitive approach to reconstruction of the southern
states after the war. Blaine served as Speaker of the House of Representatives
from 1869 until 1875.122 In 1876 he jumped into the Senate, and then ran for the
123Republican nomination for the presidency.
Blaine's presidential run was unsuccessful. 124  He failed to secure the
nomination, but he remained active in Republican politics. He backed James
Garfield's presidential run in 1880 and was rewarded during Garfield's short
126presidency with an appointment as secretary of state. Both during his service in
the administration and afterward, he worked to build the Republican Party as a
114. Utter & Larson, supra n. 14, at 468.
115. Davey, 540 U.S. at 723 n. 7.
116. The Journal of the Washington State Constitutional Convention, 1889, at vii (Beverly Paulik
Rosenow ed., Book Publg. 1962) [hereinafter Journal].
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Utter & Larson, supra n. 14, at 463 n. 54.
120. Having served as Speaker of the House for six years, Blaine went on to run for the Republican
Presidential nomination four times (securing the nomination in 1884), serve in the Senate, and serve
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national entity. 27 His efforts in working with the party bore fruit in the next
election cycle when he captured the 1884 Republican presidential nomination.
28
While he was unsuccessful in his bid for the White House, he remained active in
national politics. 129 He supported Benjamin Harrison for president in 1888, and
after Harrison's victory was again appointed secretary of state. 130 He remained in
that position until 1892, when he left due to opposition to Harrison's policies."'
Blaine died the next year.132
Blaine's long stint in the national limelight was partly a consequence of his
support within the Republican Party, particularly for party-building. That support
was not restricted to the east coast, but reached west as well, and included
Washington State.13  As former Washington Supreme Court Justice Robert F.
Utter and historian Edward J. Larson discuss in one of the most detailed
explorations of the connections between Washington's constitution and the Blaine
Amendment, the majority of the delegates to the Washington constitutional
convention were Republicans, and probably were committed to supporting Blaine:
"In all likelihood, these [delegates] were Blaine Republicans.' 134 The Washington
Republican Party had institutionally backed several of Blaine's efforts to secure
the GOP's presidential nomination and even supported Blaine in his split with
President Harrison in 1892.35 In addition, and perhaps most importantly for
purposes of establishing a connection between the Washington Constitution and
the Blaine Amendment, the Washington GOP had, in Utter and Larson's words,
"supported Blaine's well-known and long-standing views on religious
establishment and common schools."'
36
Thus, while the Washington state constitutional convention delegates were
forced by the Enabling Act to include some Blaine provisions in the state
constitution, the Republican majority was willing to go farther than the explicit
wording of the Blaine Amendment and include the Blaine-style requirements
found in Article I, § 11. The GOP's dominance at the state convention was
overwhelming. According to the Journal of the Washington State Constitutional
Convention, only one member of the drafting committee that was in charge of
overseeing the formulation of the state Bill of Rights, including Article I, § 11, was
a Democrat-its chairman C. H. Warner. 117 This Republican dominance ensured
that there would be no significant barrier to the state Bill of Rights being adopted.
127. Id.
128. Id.




133. Id. at 468-69.
134. Utter & Larson, supra n. 14, at 468.
135. Id. at 469 n. 83.
136. Id. at 469.
137. Journal, supra n. 116, at vii.
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In its final form, including Article I, § 11, the Bill of Rights was approved by the
convention by a staggering margin of 51 to 14."'
C. Religion and the Washington Constitutional Convention
The Washington state constitutional convention's embrace of the
requirements of the Blaine Amendment should not be thought of as expressing
hostility to religion in general. The framers of the state constitution were not at all
hostile to religion or religious expression in general; in its daily activities the
business of the convention was often begun with prayer, and the convention
formally received petitions from several different religious organizations and
denominations in the course of its work. 3 9 As the Washington Supreme Court has
noted, the state constitution "indicates [that its] framers were men of deep
religious beliefs and convictions, recognizing a profound reverence for religion
and its influence in all human affairs essential to the well-being of the
community."' 40  However, the convention was intent on making sure that
sectarianism was avoided. For example, the convention also incorporated, by a 55
to 19 vote, 1 explicit and overt religious language into the state constitution's
preamble, which gives thanks to "the Supreme Ruler of the Universe' '142 for the
rights guaranteed by the Washington Constitution. Such language was adopted
deliberately to avoid any hint of sectarian identification of the Deity with any
particular religious tradition.143  The convention combined the preamble's
confession of faith in the Deity with works to ensure a property tax exemption for
churches and other houses of worship, with statements in the convention
emphasizing that such places of worship should qualify for the exemption
regardless of their specific religion. 44 In both cases, the overriding concern of the
convention was to recognize and protect the role of God and religion, both
broadly understood, within civil society while avoiding the overt endorsement of
any one religious institution or sect.
This concern regarding the avoidance of sectarianism had its impact on the
convention's approach to the Blaine Amendment material it was incorporating
into the state constitution. According to the statements of some delegates to the
convention, the purpose of Article IX, § 4 was not to prohibit general instruction
in religious principles but rather to exclude overt sectarianism in the public
schools. 46 Article I, § 11, which in addition to containing Blaine Amendment
138. Id.
139. Utter & Larson, supra n. 14, at 477 ("Far from being hostile to religion, the framers viewed
religion as an important component of a stable society.").
140. Perry v. Sch. Dist. No. 81, 344 P.2d 1036, 1043 (1959).
141. Utter & Larson, supra n. 14, at 471.
142. Wash. Const. preamble ("We, the people of the State of Washington, grateful to the Supreme
Ruler of the Universe for our liberties, do ordain this constitution.").
143. Utter & Larson, supra n. 14, at 478.
144. Id. at 474-79.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 477-78.
2004]
17
DeForrest: Locke v. Davey: The Connection between the Federal Blaine Amendme
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2004
TULSA LAW REVIEW
language also functions as the general establishment clause of the Washington
Constitution, was crafted by the convention to be similar to the Blaine
Amendment and to hew closely to the established approach of the common school
movement regarding the general teaching of religion. 147 In debating a series of
amendments to Article I, § 11, the convention overtly rejected attempts to move
beyond the Blaine-style language already present in the article in order to erect an
even tighter barrier to religious "influence" in the common school system of the
state. At least two delegates voiced concern that attempts to exclude religious
influence would go too far-they could wind up removing people of faith from the
public schools.' 48 Instead of such a radical proposal, the convention sought to
restrict Article I, § l1's provisions to the core concern of the Blaine Amendment:
the prohibition of state funding for parochial education. Thus, the language of
Article I, § l's Blaine-style provision was crafted to prevent the state from
supporting "any religious worship, exercise or instruction." 49 As Utter and
Larson conclude, the approach of the convention to Article I, § 11 set it "squarely
within the common school movement, which maintained that public schools
should present wholesome, nonsectarian religious influence by teaching about
general religious principles.' 50 Far from being hostile to religion in general, the
convention sought to prevent the state, through its education system, from
supporting one strand of religious faith over another. "[C]hristianity," one
delegate noted, "and religion are not necessarily identical."' 
5
'
Such being the case, how then it is possible to reconcile the words and
actions of the Washington constitutional convention, with its emphasis on
protecting non-sectarian expressions of religiosity, with the common school
movement's anti-Catholicism and support for generic Protestantism? The
apparent discord between the convention and the common school movement
disappears when viewed in the context of the whole concept of sectarianism in the
nineteenth-century. As several scholars from various disciplines have noted,
American public life in the nineteenth-century was suffused with common
Protestant values and rituals. The strong cultural and social influence of
Protestantism in general was simply an unstated assumption in the political and
legal life of the culture."'
During the time when Washington was first stabilized as a territory, and then
admitted into the Union, there was for all intents and purposes a de facto
Protestant establishment in the United States,'53 an establishment where
147. Id. at 472.
148. Utter & Larson, supra n. 14, at 476.
149. Wash. Const. art. I, § 11.
150. Utter & Larson, supra n. 14, at 477.
151. Id. (referring to statement by delegate M.M. Godman).
152. See Stephen V. Monsma, Positive Neutrality: Letting Religious Freedom Ring 124-26 (Baker Bks.
1993); see also Viteritti, supra n. 10, at 668.
153. Monsma, supra n. 152, at 124; see Andrew J. King, Sunday Law in the Nineteenth Century, 64
Alb. L. Rev. 675, 677 (2000); see generally Stuart Buck, The Nineteenth-Century Understanding of the
Establishment Clause, 6 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 399 (2002); Steven D. Smith, Legal Discourse and the De
Facto Disestablishment, 81 Marq. L. Rev. 203 (1998).
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"Protestant Christianity and government were closely linked in mutually
supportive relationships., 154  This linkage was so profound that it went
unacknowledged and for the most part unnoticed, until it was challenged, as with
the Mormon effort to foster the practice of plural marriage, or the Catholic effort
to obtain public funding for Catholic parochial schools. Then efforts were made
to protect the de facto Protestant establishment, but at the same time to develop a
legal and political rhetoric that sought to emphasize the values and religious
traditions of the majority as a uniting factor in the social and political fabric of the
nation. l5 This was the entire modus operandi of the common school movement,
which engaged in teaching generic Protestant values and beliefs to students while
publicly eschewing that it was teaching Christianity or any sectarian religious
116belief at all. Such a de facto establishment led to the simultaneous and
seemingly contradictory existence of a privileged position for generic
Protestantism, properly understood as embodying non-sectarian religious values
and practices, in the nation's public institutions and a growing conviction in some
157kind of formal separation of church and state. Understanding this nineteenth-
century reality goes a long way toward making sense of the Washington
constitutional convention's strong support for and protection of religion as part of
the civic order of society, and its firm actions to make sure that any overt
sectarianism was avoided.
IV. AN OVERVIEW AND EVALUATION OF KEY COURT DECISIONS
INTERPRETING ARTICLE I, § 11 IN THE AREA OF PUBLIC EDUCATION
A. Introduction
The strong connection between Article I, § 11 and the failed Blaine
Amendment is evidenced not only in the historical record of the politics and
158turmoil of the nineteenth-century. It is also demonstrated by examining key
cases from Washington State that apply Article I, § 11 in the context of its
prohibition on government funding for religious education.159 This article has
already explored two such decisions concerning efforts to provide academic credit
in government-funded educational systems for Bible study, Dearie and Calvary
Bible.'6° Both of those cases, while coming to markedly different conclusions
about the constitutional practicability of non-sectarian study of sacred texts for
credit within publicly funded education, employed reasoning that exemplified the
classic concern that undergirded the Blaine Amendment: preventing sectarian
154. Monsma, supra n. 152, at 124.
155. Id. at 124-26.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Compare Wash. Const. art. I, § 11 with Joint Resolution, supra n. 10.
159. There are at least two cases in Washington that apply Article I, § 11 to activities outside of the
educational sphere: Malyon, 935 P.2d 1272 and Washington Health Care Facilities Authority v.
Spellman, 633 P.2d 866 (Wash. 1981).
160. Supra nn. 90-110 and accompanying text.
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control over government funded education. However, those two cases are not the
only cases in Washington's jurisprudence that demonstrate the effective
connection between the Blaine Amendment and Article I, § 11. The case law
from the Washington Supreme Court evidences a strong conceptual link between
Article I, § 11 and Article IX, § 4261 As noted previously, Article IX, § 4 is a
provision of the Washington Constitution that is indisputably linked to the Blaine
Amendment, both in terms of its language and in terms of its mandatory inclusion
in the Washington Constitution via the Enabling Act of 1889. An overview of the
case law applying Article I, § 11 in the educational funding context demonstrates
that the state supreme court has consistently viewed the two articles as being two
sides of the same coin as far as limiting state aid to private sectarian education is
concerned.
B. Case Law Through 1973
The first group of cases to be evaluated are those cases decided prior to 1974
where the two central Washington Blaine-style provisions, Article I, § 11 and
Article IX, § 4, were applied together as a unit by the state supreme court. In
these cases the Washington Supreme Court used the two provisions together to
resolve questions regarding permissible and impermissible state funding or aid to
religious education.162  This use of the two constitutional articles in tandem is
critical because it serves as a practical example of the close functional link
between Article IX, § 4, which is indisputably connected to the Blaine
Amendment, and Article I, § 11.163
Since both Dearle and Calvary Bible have been discussed, the first cases to
be examined are Mitchell v. Consolidated School District No. 201'64 and Visser v.
Nooksack Valley School District No. 506.165 These two cases deal with the use of
public school transportation by students attending religiously affiliated private
schools. In Mitchell, the plaintiff brought suit alleging that a state law allowing
private and parochial school students to ride on school buses operated by the state
violated the state constitution. 61 While there was no change in the routes used by
the buses, the court found that there were "substantial" additional expenses
incurred by providing public transportation to the private and parochial school
students.16  Based on these additional expenses, the court ruled that the law
violated the Washington Constitution because it provided a benefit to private and
161. See e.g. Malyon, 935 P.2d at 1278 ("Article IX, section 4 is related to article I, section 11 and
adds special and unique emphasis to the subject of religion in public schools.").
162. Decisions considering Washington Constitution Articles I, § 11 and IX, § 4 in tandem include:
State Higher Education Authority v. Graham, 529 P.2d 1051 (Wash. 1974); Calvary Bible, 436 P.2d 189;
Perry, 344 P.2d 1036; Visser v. Nooksack Valley School District No. 506, 207 P.2d 198 (Wash 1949);
Mitchell v. Consolidated School District No. 201, 135 P.2d 79 (Wash. 1943); Dearle, 173 P. 35.
163. Compare Wash. Const. art. I, § 11 with Wash. Const. art. IX, § 4; Joint Resolution, supra n. 10.
164. 135 P.2d 79.
165. 207 P.2d 198 (1943).
166. 135 P.2d at 80 (1949).
167. Id. at 81.
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parochial schools. 168  Such a benefit was a clear violation, the court held, of
Articles I, § 11 and IX, § 4.169 Not only did the court apply both provisions to the
case that was before it, it formulated a basic rule of application that seamlessly
incorporated both articles into a single application of existing state constitutional
law. 170 In effect, while consisting of two separate articles, the Washington Blaine-
style provisions were interpreted together as creating a single constitutional
rule.
171
This basic approach to applying Washington's Blaine-style provisions was
closely followed by the court six years later in Visser v. Nooksack Valley School
District No. 506. 17 In Visser, the state supreme court ruled against a couple who
sought injunctive relief against their local school district in order to obtain the
right for their children to use the public school transportation system to travel to
and from their religious school. 173 In deciding the case, the court looked at all
three of Washington's Blaine-style provisions-Articles I, § 11,. IX, § 4, and
XXVI-as well as Article IX, § 2 (a provision mandating that the state should
"provide for a general and uniform system of public schools"). 74 The court
concluded, based on the constitutional provisions at issue, as well as the earlier
decision in Mitchell, that such an injunction would be contrary to the express
provisions of Washington's constitution.75  Importantly, for purposes of
establishing the linkage between Article I, § 11 and Article IX, § 4, the court in
Visser characterized the Mitchell court's approach to the application of
Washington's Blaine-style provisions as a holistic one, specifically saying that the
court in Mitchell "considered" the applicable constitutional articles "as a
whole."' 76 The court in Visser also directly referred to Article I, § 11 and Article
IX, § 4 as possessing a singular "viewpoint.' 77
This approach to viewing Article I, § 11 and Article IX, § 4 as linked
constitutional provisions continued through later case law. In 1959, the
178Washington Supreme Court decided Perry v. School District No. 81, a case
dealing with the constitutionality of a school district release time program for
religious education. The court applied Article I, § 11 and Article IX, § 4 together
to find that the practice of the school district that was being challenged, namely,
the allocation of release time paperwork directly by the school and the use of
public facilities to make announcements regarding the release time program, was
in violation of the Washington state constitution.79
168. Id. at 81-82.
169. Id. at 81.
170. Id. at 81-82.
171. Mitchell, 135 P.2d at 81-82.
172. 207 P.2d 198.
173. Id. at 205.
174. Id. at 200-02.
175. Id. at 204.
176. Id. at 202.
177. 207 P.2d at 205.
178. 344 P.2d 1036.
179. Id. at 1039, 1043.
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There was a deviation from the pattern of applying both Washington Blaine-
style provisions in the 1973 consolidated cases of Weiss v. Bruno'80 and Weiss v.
O'Brien."" In those cases the state supreme court applied only Article IX, § 4 to
hold unconstitutional a state program that provided public tuition grants to
students attending private primary, secondary, or collegiate educational
institutions."' The court based its decision to apply only Article IX, § 4 on
prudential grounds: "[s]tanding alone, article 9, § 4 is determinative in this case.' 83
However, the following year, in State Higher Education Assistance Authority v.
Graham,84 the state supreme court returned to form and again used Article I, § 11
and Article IX, § 4 together to declare unconstitutional a state program set up to
help provide financial aid to college students, some of whom were attending
private religious educational institutions. While the court relied heavily on the
precedent set in Weiss, its formal basis for rejecting the constitutionality of the
challenged program was Articles I, § 11 and IX, § 4 viewed and applied in
tandem.l 85
C. Recent Case Law: Witters and Gallwey
After the Washington Supreme Court decided Weiss v. Bruno in 1973, there
was a long gap before another case arose that involved the application of Article I,
§ 11 in the context of public education. While the court did address the
application of Article I, § 11 in the context of a publicly-funded chaplaincy
program at a private, religiously affiliated hospital, 86 there was no educational
funding case before the state supreme court involving Article I, § 11 until the mid-
1980s.
Larry Witters, a visually disabled student, applied for funds under a state
program designed to provide financial assistance for visually disabled students
seeking vocational training. 187 Witters sought aid to attend a university to pursue a
course of study to qualify for a career in the clergy.' 88 His initial request for aid
was denied, and he brought suit in 1982 challenging the initial denial of aid. 8 9 The
case made its way before the Washington Supreme Court, which in 1984 issued a
ruling upholding the denial of aid on First Amendment Establishment Clause
grounds.'9g Since a federal constitutional provision stood as the basis of the state
high court's decision, Witters was able to appeal that decision to the U.S. Supreme
180. 509 P.2d 973 (Wash. 1973).
181. Id. (O'Brien was consolidated with Bruno in a single decision), overruled, State ex rel. Gallwey v.
Grimm, 48 P.3d 274, 284 (Wash. 2002).
182. Id. at 977, 990. While the court applied only Article IX, § 4, the petitioners sought review of the
challenged program under both Article I, § 11 and Article IX, § 4. Id. at 977-78.
183. Id. at 977.
184. 529 P.2d 1051 (1974).
185. Id. at 1053-54.
186. Malyon, 935 P.2d 1272.
187. Witters v. St. Commn. for the Blind, 689 P.2d 53, 54-55 (Wash. 1984).
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Court, which overruled the state supreme court by holding that it was permissible
under the First Amendment for Witters to have access to the financial aid
program. 9 ' Witters's case returned to Washington State for a fresh determination
of his application for funding.
192
The good news did not last long for Mr. Witters. His application to the state
vocational aid program was again rejected by the state, and Witters again
appealed to the courts.' 93 In 1989 the case once more came before the Washington
Supreme Court, which reviewed the state's decision to deny Witters aid under the
state, rather than federal, constitution-specifically Article I, § 11.'94 The court
found that the educational purpose that Witters sought to effectuate through use
of the aid, an education based on "a religious course of study at a religious school,
with a religious career as his goal," was exactly the sort of use of public funds
prohibited by "the clear language' 9 5 of Article I, § 11.
Looking at Dearle and Calvary Bible for guidance as to the meaning of
Article I, § l's prohibition on "religious instruction,' '196 the court found that the
educational program that Witters sought to pursue was one that would
"necessarily provide indoctrination in the specific beliefs of Christianity."' 97 As
such, any public aid to allow him to pursue such an education would implicate the
state in the application of public funds for religious instruction, the very thing
prohibited by Article I, § 11.198 In order to emphasize this point, the court made
clear that Article I, § 11 does not simply prohibit appropriation of government
funds for private religious instruction, but it also prohibits "the application of
public funds to religious instruction."' 99 Having disposed of Witters's case on
Article I, § 11 grounds, the court did not find it necessary to explore the impact of
Article IX, § 4.200
While the Washington Supreme Court's second decision in Witters was based
on a reading of Article I, § 11 alone, the court returned to viewing Articles I, § 11
and IX, § 4 as tandem constitutional provisions in the 2002 case of Gallwey v.
Grimm.20' That case dealt with the constitutionality of Washington's Educational
202Opportunity Grant ("EOG") program. The grant program was designed to
provide tuition assistance to college students who were attending either public or
private institutions.20 3 There were several criteria that students had to meet in
order to qualify for the grants, one of which was that the student had to "adhere to
191. Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
192. Witters v. St. Commn. for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119, 1120 (Wash. 1989) [hereinafter Witters 11].
193. Id. at 1120.
194. Id. at 1121.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Witters H, 771 P.2d at 1122.
198. Id.
199. Id. (emphasis in original).
200. Id.
201. 48 P.3d 274.
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the EOG Program's religious exclusion. ' '204 Under this exclusion, both the student
and the university's financial aid office had to agree that the university program
could not mandate that a student "be enrolled in any program that includes
religious worship, exercise, or instruction., 20 1 In addition, the student was
prohibited from "pursuing any degree in religious, seminarian, or theological
academic studies while receiving the EOG. ',206 The university's financial aid office
further had to certify that the student would not be "enrolled for any classes that
include any religious worship, exercise, or instruction., 20 7  Private institutions
participating in the program could not directly apply the funds to a participating
student's account; the funds had to first be provided to the student, who could
then disburse the funds to his or her educational institution.0 8
The program was challenged on the grounds that it violated both the First
Amendment's guarantee against the establishment of religion and Articles I, § 11,
VIII, § 5 (a prohibition on the state loaning credit to any individual or
organization), and IX, § 4 of the Washington Constitution.2°9 The Grimm court,
following Weiss and Graham, struck down the EOG program as a violation of
Article IX, § 4.210 The case was appealed to the state supreme court, which
reversed the trial court and ruled that the EOG program was permissible under
211both the state and federal constitutions. In its decision, the supreme court
focused most intently on Article IX, § 4, holding that the provision does not apply
to institutions of higher education, and overruling those portions of Weiss and
212Graham that had held otherwise.
The court did not end its examination of the constitutionality of the EOG
with its exploration of Article IX, § 4.213 The court went on to examine the impact
of Article I, § 11, finding that the EOG program did not run afoul of Article I, §
21411's requirements. The court provided a detailed overview of the article,
215particularly as interpreted in previous case law. The court found that Article I, §
11 was dedicated to preventing religious establishment and state-funded "religious
,,216instruction. Looking at the requirements of the EOG program, the court
found that the program supported neither an establishment of religion nor
religious instruction.i 7 In a strongly worded section, the court rejected any effort
to "conflate" Article I, § 11 with Article IX, § 4, holding that the two sections
204. Id. at 277.
205. Id. at 285 (citing former Wash. Rev. Code § 28B.101.040 (1993)).
206. Gallwey, 48 P.3d at 278 (quoting Clerk's Paper at 1082).
207. Id. at 278.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 278-79.
211. Gallwey, 48 P.3d at 288.
212. Id. at 280-84.
213. Id. at 287.
214. Id.
215. See id. at 284-87.
216. Gallwey, 48 P.3d at 285.
217. Id. at 288.
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should be applied differently, with Article IX, § 4 being applied with more
"rigorous scrutiny" when evaluating programs that impacted public schools, and
Article I, § 11 being applied in a more "even-handed" fashion in regards to "all
challenges" arising under its provisions. 18
While there is no doubt that the court's decision in Gallwey draws a clear§ 219
distinction between Article I, § 11 and Article IX, § 4, that distinction in no way
undermines the fact that the two provisions are connected both in purpose and in
motivation. The court rightly drew a distinction between the two provisions that
had been obscured in earlier case law involving public funding for tuition
• . . 220
assistance to students attending private religious educational institutions.
Article I, § 11, which prohibits any use of public funds or property to support
religious instruction or activity, by its very wording is broader than Article IX, § 4,
which applies to ensuring that public schools are free from "sectarian control or
influence., 221 As the court in Gallwey points out, this difference in wording affects
the mechanics of how the provisions should be applied when dealing with
questions of government aid to higher education.222 But this distinction does not
mean that the two provisions are not, in origin and meaning, linked. As the
histories of the Blaine Amendment and the Washington Constitution show, both
Article I, § 11 and Article IX, § 4, along with Article XXVI, had a common core
purpose, which was to prevent the use of public funds to assist in the propagation
of sectarian ideology, either in the public schools or through state-assisted private
223
religious educational efforts. Both constitutional articles further this purpose in
different ways, but are united in this central concern. The court itself underscores
the linkage between the two provisions in its description of the hermeneutical
mechanics of applying both provisions, stating clearly that its "even-handed"
approach to Article I, § 11 will not result in any breaches of the wall between
church and state as far as the public schools are concerned because Article IX, § 4
224
remains to protect such separation. The two articles, in effect, work together,
with Article IX, § 4 providing backup for any lapses in non-sectarianism that
might be engendered by a neutral application of Article I, § 11. The two articles
working together effectuate the exact sort of preclusion of government aid for
religious education or instruction that motivated the various versions of the Blaine
Amendment in the nineteenth-century.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has sought to demonstrate that there are strong reasons to regard
Article I, § 11 of the Washington Constitution as being both textually and
218. Id. at 286-87.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Compare Wash. Const. art. I, § 11 with Wash. Const. art. IX, § 4.
222. Gallwey, 48 P.3d at 287.
223. See supra nn. 138-39, 152 and accompanying text.
224. Gallwey, 48 P.3d at 287.
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ideologically linked to the three versions of the failed Blaine Amendment.
Ideologically, the text of Article I, § 11 closely parallels the concerns that were
part and parcel of the common school movement of the nineteenth-century, the
movement that propelled the Blaine Amendment to national prominence. The
language of Article I, § 11 closely parallels language that was included in the
various versions of the Blaine Amendment. Although unlike Articles IX, § 4 and
XXVI, Article I, § 11 was not mandated for inclusion in the state constitution by
the Enabling Act of 1889, its inclusion was strongly supported by the Washington
State Constitutional Convention, a convention dominated by Republicans loyal,
both personally and ideologically, to the sponsor of the Blaine Amendment,
James Blaine. In addition, the Washington Supreme Court has consistently
viewed Article I, § 11 as a linked provision, at least as far as public funding for
education is concerned, with Article IX, § 4, a provision of the Washington
Constitution which very clearly has its origins in the Blaine Amendment and the
Enabling Act of 1889. This linkage is apparent in the early cases applying the two
articles. Even in the recent case of Gallwey v. Grimm, the court's attempt to
create some interpretational differentiation between the two provisions has only
strengthened the interdependence of the two provisions, at least as far as
guaranteeing the separation of church and state in regards to public education is
concerned. Despite the U.S. Supreme Court's dismissive footnote in Locke v.
Davey, there are very good reasons indeed to consider Article I, § 11 as a Blaine
amendment provision contained within Washington's state constitution.
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